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Broccoli made its appearance early in the debate over the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(ACA). At first it seemed a joke, one of 
those spasms of political hyperbole that 
seem to emerge in any heated public de-
bate. At issue was the constitutional au-
thority by which the U.S. Congress could 
require people to purchase health insur-
ance—the individual mandate provision 
of the ACA . If the Constitution were read 
to allow the federal government to require 
individuals to purchase health insurance, 
critics asked, was there anything to pre-
vent the government from requiring peo-
ple to do all sorts of things against their 
will? Could the government demand that 
people purchase broccoli?
No one in Congress had ever serious-
ly considered such a broccoli mandate, 
of course. The issue at hand was health 
care and insurance, not green vegetables. 
Broccoli was a pure hypothetical of the 
slippery-slope, reductio ad absurdum va-
riety. Yet the broccoli hypothetical proved 
to be a surprisingly persistent presence in 
the constitutional challenge to health care. 
Conservative lawyers pressed the broccoli 
analogy (along with other hypothetical 
mandates) in their numerous legal chal-
lenges to the ACA, and broccoli found its 
way into the text of several lower court 
opinions. When the U.S. Supreme Court 
Justices pressed the broccoli hypothetical 
on Solicitor General Verrilli during oral 
arguments, the only surprise was that he 
did not have a crisp response to the ques-
tion everyone fully expected would be 
asked.
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Na-
tional Federation of Independent Business 
v. Sebelius (NFIB) sealed broccoli’s im-
mortality in constitutional jurisprudence. 
The three main written opinions included 
twelve references to broccoli and five sep-
arate discussions of the broccoli mandate’s 
legal implications. Five Justices cited the 
government’s inability to provide a satis-
fying answer to the broccoli hypothetical 
as a justification for creating a novel lim-
itation on Congress’s Commerce Clause 
powers and for concluding that the ACA’s 
*Excerpted from Mark Rosen and Christopher Schmidt, Why Broccoli? Limiting Principles and Popular Con-
stitutionalism in the Health Care Decision, forthcoming in volume 61 of the UCLA Law Review (2013).
Why Broccoli?
Limiting Principles and Popular Constitutionalism  
in the Health Care Case
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mandate exceeded that limit. Even the dis-
senters to the Commerce Clause holding 
felt compelled to respond to what Justice 
Ginsburg referred to as “the broccoli hor-
rible.”
The Justices’ consensus concerning 
broccoli’s significance in their constitu-
tional analysis of the ACA conceals an 
as-of-yet unrecognized puzzle: All the 
Justices took for granted that the Court 
had to provide a response to the broccoli 
hypothetical. To appreciate the puzzle, 
three points must be recognized. First, 
the broccoli hypothetical was, at base, 
a provocative way to demand a limiting 
principle; any answer as to why Congress 
had power to enact the ACA’s mandate, 
but not the hypothetical broccoli mandate, 
would require the identification of such 
a principle. Second, the ACA’s mandate 
raised a novel constitutional question; 
Congress had never before used its Com-
merce Clause powers to require virtually 
everybody to purchase something. Third, 
a survey of constitutional history shows 
that when confronted with novel constitu-
tional questions, the Court almost always 
declines to provide limiting principles 
that define the metes and bounds of the 
constitutional power or right at issue. 
Instead, the Court typically answers the 
question in a narrow, localist fashion that 
analyzes and answers the constitutionality 
of only the governmental action that is be-
fore the Court. Indeed, the Court typically 
avoids any attempt at identifying a limit-
ing principle until it has considered the 
constitutional question many times, and 
not infrequently it declines to ever identify 
a limiting principle.
So here is the puzzle: Why did the 
NFIB Court assume that it could uphold 
the individual mandate on Commerce 
Clause grounds only if a limiting principle 
could be found? Indeed, why did not even 
a single Justice suggest that the broccoli 
hypothetical need not be answered—that 
is to say, that a limiting principle need not 
have been provided—to decide this case?
The answer to this puzzle lies outside 
the Court. It requires attention to dynam-
ics of constitutional development that 
scholars have examined under the label 
“popular constitutionalism.” What made 
this case unique was the exceptional level 
of demand from outside the courts that 
the limiting-principles question play a 
central role in resolving the constitutional 
challenge. By the time the case reached 
the Supreme Court, a robust public en-
gagement with the constitutional issues 
had already developed. This engagement 
was the product of the Tea Party move-
ment, which was committed to a belief 
that the ACA violated core constitutional 
principles. The Republican presidential 
primary fueled these Tea Party sentiments 
with the contenders’ universal condem-
nation of the ACA. Lower court rulings 
that struck down the individual mandate 
animated these sentiments even further. 
At the center of this roiling public debate 
were the broccoli hypothetical and the 
difficult questions it raised about limiting 
principles. These popular constitutional 
demands, which revolved around the sin-
gularly evocative broccoli hypothetical, 
structured public expectations about the 
stakes of the ACA challenge to such a de-
gree that it would have been notable had 
“We argue that popular 
mobilization against the ACA . . . 
served to link the extrajudicial 
constitutional movement 
mobilized against the law and 
the constitutional challenge 
taking place in the courts.”
Limiting Principles and Popular Constitutionalism
the Court chosen not to go beyond the 
facts of the case to engage with the limits 
of congressional power.
The story of broccoli, limiting princi-ples, and the ACA challenge raises dif-
ficult questions about the relationship be-
tween popular constitutional demands and 
the courts. What are the costs and benefits 
of allowing extrajudicial pressures to in-
fluence the Supreme Court’s evaluation of 
constitutional issues? In this Article, we 
argue that popular mobilization against 
the ACA—including the demand for a 
response to the broccoli hypothetical—
served to link the extrajudicial constitu-
tional movement mobilized against the 
law and the constitutional challenge tak-
ing place in the courts. While much of the 
critique of the mandate outside the courts 
focused on ways in which it violated ba-
sic principles of liberty and free choice, a 
straight rights-based claim, such as one 
based on the Due Process Clause, never 
had a chance inside the courts. The legal 
issue before the courts was, strictly speak-
ing, a question of congressional power and 
federalism, not individual liberty. Thus 
there was something of a disconnect be-
tween the technical ways in which courts 
engaged with the constitutional chal-
lenge—as a question of structural limits 
and enumerated powers—and the ways in 
which most Americans thought about the 
constitutional issues—as a question of in-
dividual liberty versus government regu-
lation. The ACA litigation offers a striking 
example of how doctrinal analysis can fail 
to map onto public sentiment about the 
constitutional stakes.
How the courts approach a particu-
lar constitutional issue often differs from 
how the public views the same issue of 
course. Yet in the ACA case, this dynamic 
was particularly notable because the dif-
ference was so significant and the public 
interest in the constitutional dispute was 
so intense. The hypothetical broccoli 
mandate shrunk this disconnect in a way 
that advantaged the law’s challengers. In 
effect, broccoli served a two-way signaling 
function between judicial actors (lawyers 
and judges) and nonjudicial actors (polit-
ical actors and the larger public). Its res-
onance in the political arena signaled to 
those litigating the case the importance of 
liberty concerns in the larger extrajudicial 
constitutional battle over the ACA. And 
it provided judicial actors a symbol with 
which to demonstrate their sympathy with 
this liberty-based critique of the health in-
surance mandate. The fact that the Court 
identified a concern with protecting in-
dividual liberty as a core principle of its 
commerce power analysis, and did so at 
least partly in response to extrajudicial de-
mands from critics of the law, is a classic 
example of the generative, responsive po-
tential of popular constitutionalism.
But another, more problematic, dy-
namic of popular constitutionalism is at 
play in the ACA case. In NFIB, popular 
constitutional demands not only pressured 
the Court to more squarely confront the 
potential liberty costs of the individual 
mandate but—by insisting that the limit-
ing principle issue be resolved—also may 
have pressured the Court into abandoning 
the established practice by which it devel-
ops constitutional doctrine. In this way, 
the evocative broccoli hypothetical and 
related popular constitutional arguments 
not only affected the substance of the con-
stitutional principles the Court considered 
in NFIB but also the process by which it 
worked through the doctrinal standard 
that emerged from the ruling.
If one values the benefits of the com-
mon law, inductive approach to shaping 
constitutional principles in the courts, this 
little appreciated dynamic of popular con-
stitutionalism may be cause for concern. 
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The tools of constitutional decisionmaking 
in the judicial realm are—and we sug-
gest should be—distinct from the tools of 
constitutional claim making that tend to 
resonate outside the courts. The Court’s 
premature engagement with limiting prin-
ciples bypassed the benefits of its ordinary 
incremental, case-by-case analysis and 
circumvented institutional synergies that 
can generate superior and more democrat-
ically legitimate outcomes when courts 
and legislatures work together to flesh out 
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Adanna came into this world swaddled in apartheid’s indignities. Adanna’s father was a white farm 
owner and her birth mother was one of his 
African farm hands. When Adanna’s birth 
mother died, her father abruptly dropped 
her off in Kliptown—a town about 35 ki-
lometers from Johannesburg—to live with 
an African woman named Ma Zwane and 
her son. That is the last time either Adan-
na or Ma Zwane laid eyes on the man. Ma 
Zwane eventually adopted Adanna and 
she became a full-fledged member of the 
Zwane family.
Ma Zwane was a nurse. When look-
ing at one of her pictures you see a mid-
dle-aged woman, lips full with pride, 
smooth dark skin impervious to the wrin-
kles time etches. Although the South Afri-
can apartheid state made it especially dif-
ficult for Africans to own property in the 
cities, Ma Zwane was unbowed. She saved 
her modest earnings and eventually pur-
chased two properties in Kliptown. Her 
properties brought in a steady stream of 
rental income and also earned her respect 
*A summary of Bernadette Atuahene’s forthcoming book, Dignity Takings: Addressing the Legacy of 
Land Dispossession in South Africa, to be published by Oxford University Press in 2014.
Dignity Takings:
Addressing the Legacy of Land Dispossession
in South Africa
BY BERNADETTE ATUAHENE
and social standing among her neighbors 
in Kliptown—a tight knit, cosmopolitan 
community where Africans, Indians, Chi-
nese, whites, and coloureds lived side by 
side. 
Ma Zwane dreamed that Adanna 
would one day secure an education that 
could shield her from the physical and 
mental violence that apartheid heaped on 
people kissed by the sun. So, when Adan-
na finished standard eight (grade 10), 
Ma Zwane enrolled her in a commercial 
course where she learned shorthand and 
typewriting. Unfortunately, despite her ed-
ucation and specialized training, Adanna’s 
brown skin prevented her from advancing. 
“I could not get a job because at the time 
they were not hiring non-whites in the 
offices to do all that, and as a result there 
was nothing else I could do but go to the 
factory.” As the dreams Ma Zwane wove 
for Adanna began to unstitch, she prayed 
that the properties could provide Adanna 
with the extra layer of protection that she 
so desperately needed as a black woman 
living under South Africa’s apartheid re-
[ 9 ] FALL 2013
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gime. But, after Ma Zwane died in 1955, 
Adanna’s life began to unravel. 
To execute its white supremacist agen-
da of subordination and separation, in 
1963, the South African apartheid gov-
ernment proclaimed that only Europeans 
could inhabit Kliptown. Soon after, the 
government uprooted Adanna and her 
neighbors and relocated them to town-
ships designated for their specific racial 
and ethnic groups. After forcing Adanna 
and her brother to move to Soweto (the 
township designated for Africans), the 
government demolished the two proper-
ties that they inherited from Ma Zwane 
and gave them only nominal compen-
sation. With a heavy heart Adanna ob-
served, “when you own something, you 
feel proud that you have got something. 
But, when they take that away from 
you, feel naked. . . . You feel as if you are 
stripped naked. You are nothing.”1 The 
bulldozers that razed Kliptown did not 
just demolish physical buildings, they de-
stroyed Adanna’s vibrant community, stole 
her inheritance, and denied her dignity. 
Most importantly, the destruction and re-
location were part of the apartheid regime’s 
strategy to subjugate blacks and cement 
their position as sub-persons in the polity.
South Africa is not the only nation 
where one group of people has subjugated 
another and stripped them of their prop-
erty and dignity. Other examples include 
the Nazi confiscation of property from 
Jews during World War II; the US expro-
priation of Japanese property during their 
internment; the Hutu taking of property 
from Tutsis during and after the genocide; 
the US, Canadian, and Australian com-
mandeering of native peoples’ property; 
the European usurpation of property 
from native peoples during colonialism 
and apartheid; Idi Amin’s banishment of 
1 Confidential interview, Gauteng, South Africa 
(2008).
people of Indian descent from Uganda 
and the confiscation of their property; and 
Saddam Hussein’s seizing of property from 
the Kurds in Iraq. 
The list is long, but when the wars 
stopped, apartheid and colonialism fell, 
the dictatorships ended, and the genocides 
halted, the governments that emerged 
from the ashes had to navigate the per-
ilous landscape surrounding the return 
of land and other property to displaced 
or decimated populations. These nations 
had a choice: they could ignore the fact 
that people were deprived of their prop-
erty, or they could address it. Many states 
addressed past property dispossession 
by providing a remedy. A comprehensive 
remedy, however, addresses the full spec-
trum of damage done by the disposses-
sion. 
In certain instances, the damage is ex-
tensive because the dispossession is part 
of a larger strategy to further subjugate a 
certain group within the polity by denying 
their humanity or their capacity to reason. 
This type of dispossession is what I call 
dignity takings, which is when a state di-
rectly or indirectly destroys or confiscates 
property rights from owners or occupiers 
who it deems to be sub-persons without 
paying just compensation or without a 
legitimate public purpose. Dignity res-
toration is a comprehensive remedy that 
compensates people for the physical assets 
confiscated while also addressing the dig-
nity deprivations involved. 
International law and most programs 
aimed at remedying past property seizures 
have focused on reparations rather than 
dignity restoration. (See Atuahene, “From 
Reparation to Restoration...,” 60 SMU 
Law Review 1419 (2007); Scott Leckie, 
“Housing and Property Issues for Refu-
gees and Internally Displaced Persons...,” 
19 Refugee Survey Quarterly 5 (2000).) 
Reparations is “the right to have restored 
Dignity Takings
to them property of which they were de-
prived in the course of the conflict and 
to be compensated appropriately for any 
such property that cannot be restored 
to them.” (United Nations, Report of the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination (1996).) While reparations 
involve reimbursement for the proper-
ty taken, dignity restoration is based on 
principles of restorative justice and thus 
seeks to rehabilitate the dispossessed and 
reintegrate them into the fabric of soci-
ety. As John Braithwaite states, restorative 
justice is interested in “restoring property 
loss, restoring injury, restoring a sense of 
security, restoring 
dignity, restoring 




mony based on a 
feeling that justice 
has been done, and 
restoring social 
support.” (“Restor-
ative Justice...,” 25 
Crime and Justice 
1 (1999).) When 
reparations and 
restorative justice 
are married, dignity restoration is the off-
spring of this formidable union. 
Most states that have addressed past 
property violations have not undertaken 
dignity restoration because it is a more 
time-consuming, complicated and ex-
pensive remedy than reparations. South 
Africa’s colonial and apartheid era land 
dispossessions are a quintessential exam-
ple of dignity takings, and the post-apart-
heid government is unique because it 
has tried to move beyond reparations to 
facilitate dignity restoration. It understood 
its land restitution program as an oppor-
tunity to restore wealth as well as dignity 
to its black citizens. (See South Africa’s 
Department of Land Affairs Annual Report, 
2001–2002 (2002).) Using the South Afri-
can land restitution process as a case, the 
central question that the book considers 
is: when there has been a dignity taking, 
what does dignity restoration require? 
The primary data source was 141 in-
depth, semi-structured interviews of peo-
ple from Johannesburg, Cape Town and 
surrounding areas who participated in the 
South African land restitution program. 
In addition, the book relies on secondary 
sources such as government documents, 
books, newspapers and academic articles; 
26 semi-structured 
interviews of offi-
cials working for 




I conducted while 
occupying an office 
in the Central Land 
Claims Commission 
in Pretoria in 2008.
Part I of the book introduces and 
defines the book’s 
first central concept—dignity takings. Us-
ing insights from social contract theory, 
the first chapter develops the theoretical 
framework for dignity takings. To demon-
strate empirically how dignity takings un-
folded in South Africa, the second chapter 
uses respondents’ accounts of their lives 
before the forced removals and how the 
apartheid state displaced them from their 
homes and property. The central finding 
is that dignity takings in South Africa in-
volved deprivations of wealth, agency and 
community.
Part II of the book introduces and 
defines the book’s second central con-
“This type of dispossession 
is what I call dignity takings, 
which is when a state directly 
or indirectly destroys or 
confiscates property rights 
from owners or occupiers 
whom it deems to be sub- 
persons without paying just 
compensation or without a 
legitimate public purpose.”
[ 11 ] FALL 2013
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cept, dignity restoration, and investigates 
whether or not the South African land 
restitution process facilitated it. In the 
third chapter, interviews of commission 
employees provide their perspective of 
how the restitution program was supposed 
to operate in theory and how it actually 
worked in practice. This perspective is 
counterpoised with a description of how 
the process worked based on interviews 
of respondents, who each went through 
the land restitution process. Two stories 
emerge from this double-sided analysis. 
One story is about how the ever-looming 
deadline to finalize all the claims impaired 
the commission’s ability to effectively ad-
dress the deprivations of wealth, agency 
and community. The other story is about 
how dispossessed people were often over-
whelmed and unable to smoothly navigate 
their way through the complicated restitu-
tion process because they did not have the 
financial resources, knowledge, networks, 
or assistance from civil society organiza-
tions necessary to hold the commission 
accountable when it was not acting in 
their interest or strictly in accordance with 
the relevant laws. 
The fourth chapter explains why a 
sustained conversation between commis-
sion officials and respondents increased 
the state’s capacity to address deprivations 
of wealth, agency and community and 
thereby facilitate dignity restoration. Un-
fortunately, the communication strategy 
adopted by the commission was suscep-
tible to communication breakdowns that 
obstructed these important conversations. 
Since there were about 80,000 claims filed, 
respondents who had the power to de-
mand the attention of commission officials 
had their voices heard while those who 
could not were silenced.
The fifth chapter explores the ways 
in which the restitution awards affected 
respondents’ wealth and dignity. It de-
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scribes the circumstances under which the 
restitution awards increased respondents’ 
net worth. The chapter then explores how 
respondents created meaning by using 
the awards in ways that they felt honored 
those who suffered dignity takings, but 
died before they received justice.
The book concludes by moving the 
discussion from the South African case 
back to the global stage. While history is 
replete with instances where communities 
and individuals were subject to dignity 
takings as a result of war, political turmoil, 
dictatorships, or colonial regimes, when 
dignity takings occur in the future, inter-
national organizations, bureaucrats, policy 
makers, NGOs and intellectuals can use 
the South African experience to shed light 
on how to facilitate dignity restoration. ■
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Professor Nahmod has served as chair of the Section on Civil Rights, the Section on 
Law and Education, and the Section on Law and Religion of the Association of Amer-
ican Law Schools. In 2001, he received the Jefferson Fordham Lifetime Achievement 
Award for his work in Section 1983 jurisprudence from the American Bar Association’s 
section on State and Local Government Law. He founded and for many years co-direct-
ed the Institute for Law and the Humanities.
Professor Nahmod blogs on Section 1983, constitutional law and other law-related 
topics at nahmodlaw.com.
For more, visit his faculty webpage at www.kentlaw.iit.edu/faculty/snahmod.
Distinguished Professor of Law
BA, University of Chicago
JD, LLM, Harvard Law School
MA, Religious Studies, University of Chicago 
Divinity School
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Section 1983 famously provides a fed-eral damages remedy against state and local government officials and 
local governments for violations of con-
stitutional rights. Frequently used by liti-
gants to promote constitutional account-
ability, it generates considerable litigation 
in the federal courts. It has also been, and 
remains, a vehicle for the articulation of 
much constitutional law. Although section 
1983 was enacted in 1871, it was largely 
dormant for many decades because of re-
strictive interpretations of state action and 
the Fourteenth Amendment.
It was only in 1951, when the semi-
nal decision in Tenney v. Brandhove was 
handed down, that the Supreme Court for 
the first time expressly interpreted the lan-
guage of section 1983.
Tenney arrived at the Court in 1950 
when Harry Truman was President and as 
the Cold War between the United States 
and the Soviet Union was heating up. Both 
countries were allies during the Second 
World War but in the immediate post-
war years an “Iron Curtain” (to use the 
famous metaphor of Winston Churchill) 
had descended over Europe. The Soviet 
Union exacerbated the relationship by us-
ing spies against the United States to steal 
the science of the atomic bomb, leading 
to the Soviet Union’s testing of an atomic 
bomb in 1949. As a result of these and 
other factors, including the Korean War 
that began in 1950, anti-Communism 
sentiment began to pervade American 
politics and society generally. At the na-
tional level this was exemplified by the 
activities of the House Committee on 
Un-American Activities and the growth 
of McCarthyism, a particularly strident 
form of political anti-Communism.
In 1949, William Brandhove, the 
plaintiff in Tenney and an admitted Com-
munist, sued members of the California 
Senate’s Fact-Finding Committee on 
Un-American Activities, the so-called 
“Tenney Committee,” under section 
1983 for $250,000 in connection with 
his having been summoned as a witness 
at a hearing on un-American activities. 
The plaintiff alleged that the hearing was 
*Excerpted from Sheldon Nahmod, Section 1983 Is Born: The Interlocking Supreme Court Stories of Tenney 
and Monroe, forthcoming in volume 17 of the Lewis & Clark Law Review (2013).
Section 1983 Is Born:
The Interlocking Supreme Court Stories of
Tenney and Monroe
BY SHELDON NAHMOD
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conducted without a legitimate legislative 
purpose but rather to intimidate and deter 
him in violation of his First and Four-
teenth Amendment rights. The district 
court dismissed for failure to state a claim 
but the Ninth Circuit reversed even while 
expressing doubt that the plaintiff would 
ultimately prevail on the merits. It held 
that the plaintiff could inquire into wheth-
er the members of the Tenney Committee 
had an impermissible purpose, and thus 
abused their powers, in conducting the 
hearing in violation of plaintiff ’s First and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights.
The fact that the case was granted cer-
tiorari was not surprising: the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s decision in Tenney, if left standing, 
had the potential to hamper, if not under-
mine altogether, state legislative investi-
gations into domestic Communism and 
Communist subversion. In addition, as the 
defendants pointed out in their Petition, to 
the extent that federal courts could inquire 
into legislative motivation, separation of 
powers concerns were directly implicated. 
This would threaten long-standing Con-
gressional investigations into Communist 
subversion.
Tenney pitted two influential Supreme 
Court justices, Felix Frankfurter and Wil-
liam Douglas, against one another in ma-
jority and dissenting opinions, respective-
ly. Justice Frankfurter, a former Harvard 
Law School professor and outspoken civil 
rights and liberties proponent appointed 
to the Court by President Roosevelt, had 
become an unremitting advocate of feder-
alism, deference to politically accountable 
bodies and judicial restraint, as reflected 
in his majority opinion in Tenney. In con-
trast, Justice Douglas, a former Columbia 
Law School and Yale Law School profes-
sor, a former chairman of the Securities 
and Exchange Commission, and similarly 
an appointee of President Roosevelt, was 
an ardent proponent of individual rights 
who had relatively little concern for feder-
alism and was the sole dissenter in Tenney.
Ten years later, in 1961, the Court handed down another seminal sec-
tion 1983 decision in Monroe v. Pape, a 
case brought by an African-American 
involving alleged police misconduct. 
Monroe arose in the post–Brown v. Board 
of Education period when concern with 
domestic Communist subversion was still 
present but diminished, and the nation’s 
attention was increasingly focused on 
racial discrimination. There had already 
been highly publicized violence as well as 
marches on Little Rock, Arkansas and on 
Montgomery and Selma, Alabama. But in 
the 1960’s the pace and intensity of such 
demonstrations (led by Martin Luther 
King, Jr. and others), together with the 
violent Southern responses to them, were 
to increase markedly and eventually give 
rise to the creation of an effective political 
coalition supporting racial equality.
Monroe dealt with the section 1983 
cause of action itself, the Fourteenth 
Amendment and with local government 
liability. The plaintiffs, African-American 
James Monroe and his family (including 
young children), alleged in their 1959 law-
suit that, in the early morning of October 
29, 1958, thirteen Chicago police officers 
broke into their home, “routed them 
from bed, made them stand naked in the 
living room, and ransacked every room, 
emptying drawers and ripping mattress 
covers.” They also alleged that the police 
“Tenney and Monroe demon-
strate that the early and deep 
tension between individual 
rights and federalism was pres-
ent at the very beginning of 
section 1983 jurisprudence.”
Section 1983 Is Born
officers had leveled racial insults. James 
Monroe was then taken to the police sta-
tion and detained on “open charges” for 
ten hours, was interrogated in connection 
with a murder, was not taken before a 
magistrate, was not permitted to call his 
family or attorney and was subsequently 
released with no charges brought against 
him. He claimed that the police officers, 
who had no search or arrest warrant, vio-
lated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amend-
ment rights. Using section 1983, he sued 
them for damages and also sued the City 
of Chicago for damages expressly using 
a respondeat superior theory. The district 
court dismissed the complaint and the 
Seventh Circuit, relying on its decision in 
Stift v. Lynch, affirmed on the ground that 
the alleged misconduct of a city’s police 
officers did not make a “sufficient showing 
of a violation” of section 1983.
Justice Douglas’s clerk, Steven B. Duke, 
recommended granting certiorari not only 
because there was a circuit split, but also 
because the Seventh Circuit’s decision (a 
“bafflement”) had simply ignored section 
1983. The local government liability issue, 
though, was apparently collateral in Duke’s 
view. Duke further commented that he 
could find no extended discussion in the 
legislative history of “color of law.”
In Monroe, which was only the second 
Supreme Court decision interpreting sec-
tion 1983, Justices Frankfurter and Doug-
las were again on opposite sides. But this 
time it was Justice Douglas who wrote the 
majority opinion. His opinion emphasized 
individual rights, rejected the defendants’ 
federalism contentions, expansively in-
terpreted section 1983 and ruled for the 
plaintiff against police officers. In contrast, 
Justice Frankfurter wrote an extensive, 
and aggressive, partial dissent on the color 
of law issue, emphasizing federalism. 
Section 1983 jurisprudence was born 
in these two interlocking cases. At the 
outset, the stories of Tenney and Monroe 
must be understood in the political and 
social settings in which they arose. The 
Cold War and anti-Communist senti-
ment situate Tenney while the Civil Rights 
movement and the post–Brown era situate 
Monroe. The stories also emerge from the 
parties’ petitions for certiorari and briefs 
in Tenney and Monroe, and in Monroe’s 
oral argument, as well as the papers of Jus-
tices Frankfurter and Douglas and in their 
majority and dissenting opinions. In par-
ticular, Justice Frankfurter, as an advocate 
of federalism, played an outsized role in 
both decisions.
Tenney and Monroe demonstrate that the 
early and deep tension between individual 
rights and federalism—a tension that began 
with the Fourteenth Amendment and con-
tinues to this day—was present at the very 
beginning of the development of the Su-
preme Court’s section 1983 jurisprudence.  ■
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PRE- AND POST-JUDGMENT
REVIEW OF SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT DENIALS
AFTER ORTIZ V. JORDAN: 
A WIDER AND DEEPER LOOK
forthcoming    
Distinguished Professor of Law
BA, University of Rochester
JD, Harvard Law School
Joan Steinman’s scholarly work always has focused on the operation of the federal courts, sometimes on aspects of complex litigation such as class actions and multi-
district litigation, but often on matters of subject-matter jurisdiction. She created a body 
of scholarship focused on jurisdictional issues that were complicated by their situation/
embedding in cases that were removed from state court and therefore were governed by 
the interplay between the core jurisdictional statutes and the removal and remand statutes. 
In recent years, Professor Steinman has expanded her work to address important issues of 
appellate jurisdiction, practice and procedure. Thus, she has written about the constitu-
tionality and propriety of appellate courts’ resolving issues in the first instance, standing 
to appeal and the right to defend a judgment in the federal courts, the appellate rights of 
persons who are not full-fledged parties, “hypothetical jurisdiction” in the federal appel-
late courts, and pendent appellate jurisdiction. She also co-authored a casebook, Appellate 
Courts: Structures, Functions, Processes and Personnel (LexisNexis 2d ed., 2006 and 2009 
Supplement) (with Daniel J. Meador and Thomas E. Baker).
In her most recent article, which—at this writing—is under submission to law re-
views, Professor Steinman brings her careful and thorough analysis to the question: under 
what circumstances, if any, should federal courts of appeals review a denial of summa-
ry judgment, after a case has gone to trial and judgment? This is an issue on which the 
federal intermediate courts of appeals are split; an issue that the Supreme Court viewed as 
important enough to grant certiorari on; and an issue that the Court ended up addressing 
poorly and only in dicta, leading to a further circuit split on the effect of its decision.
For more, visit her faculty webpage at www.kentlaw.iit.edu/faculty/jsteinman.
Joan Steinman
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I am not a fan of motions for summary judgment. Nonetheless, I write here in support of the post-trial, post-judg-
ment appealability of denials of summary 
judgment, in limited circumstances. We 
sometimes should allow appeals of deni-
als, as well as grants, of such judgments, 
just as we allow appeals of all other orders 
that may constitute harmful error. 
Ordinarily, when a court denies a mo-
tion for summary judgment, the denial is 
not immediately appealable. It merely re-
sults in the case proceeding. The denial is 
immediately appealable only if it satisfies 
a common law or statutory exception to 
the final judgment rule, such as 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1292(a) or § 1292(b) or mandamus. In 
most cases, the first opportunity to appeal 
a denial of summary judgment will arise 
after final judgment.  
However, when a motion for summa-
ry judgment was based on a defendant’s 
absolute or qualified immunity from suit, 
denial of the motion may be appealable 
under the collateral order doctrine. Then, 
an immediate appeal from the denial 
is available when the appeal presents a 
“purely legal issue” such as what clearly 
established law was at the time of defen-
dant’s challenged actions, but an imme-
diate interlocutory appeal is not available 
when the denial of summary judgment 
rested on the district judge’s conclusion 
that factual issues, genuinely in dispute, 
precluded summary judgment. If the de-
fendant fails to take the immediate appeal, 
or if that appeal is rejected on non-merits 
grounds such as untimeliness, the de-
fendant will want to appeal the denial of 
summary judgment after final judgment 
against him.
This Article addresses whether de-
fendants who fail to take an available 
pre-judgment appeal of a summary judg-
ment denial waive the right to appeal the 
denial after trial and final judgment. It 
also addresses whether defendants who 
did not waive the right to appeal the de-
nial, including those who had no oppor-
tunity to take a pre-judgment appeal, may 
do so after trial and final judgment. Prior 
to Ortiz v. Jordan, 131 S. Ct. 884 (2011), 
*Excerpted from Joan Steinman, Pre- and Post-Judgment Review of Summary Judgment Denials after Ortiz v. 
Jordan: A Wider and Deeper Look, currently pending publication.
Pre- and Post-Judgment Review
of Summary Judgment Denials after Ortiz v. Jordan:
A Wider and Deeper Look
BY JOAN STEINMAN
[ 21 ] FALL 2013
[ 22 ]  IIT CHICAGO-KENT FACULTY PERSPECTIVES
Joan Steinman
all federal appeals courts held that, as a 
general rule, they would not entertain 
post-trial, post-judgment appeals of sum-
mary judgment denials. But some made a 
“legal question exception.” The Supreme 
Court perceived the circuits to have di-
vided, and granted certiorari in Ortiz v. 
Jordan to resolve the question whether a 
party may appeal an order denying sum-
mary judgment after a district court has 
conducted a full trial on the merits. 
The Court immediately answered with 
an unqualified “no.” But that was dicta; 
the Court actually declined to address the 
question that it perceived had split the cir-
cuits, because in this case, the Court con-
cluded, the denial of summary judgment 
rested on genuine issues of material fact. 
So, what should the law be?
First, when interlocutory appeals of denials of summary judgment are per-
mitted, those appeals should be permis-
sive, rather than mandatory, as the federal 
intermediate appellate courts nearly unan-
imously hold.
When interlocutory appeals of sum-
mary judgment denials are not available, 
or when they are available but are permis-
sive and not taken, such appeals should 
be permitted when summary judgment 
was denied based on the court’s decision 
of a question of law, but not when it was 
denied based on a finding that there were 
genuine issues of material fact. Reviewing 
a denial of summary judgment after trial 
is inappropriate in the latter instance be-
cause it is appropriate to view the factual 
base on which the motion was decided as 
superseded by the evidence adduced at 
trial, and “a judgment after a full trial is 
superior to a pretrial decision because the 
factfinder’s verdict depends on credibility 
assessments that a pretrial paper record 
simply cannot allow.” Chesapeake Paper 
Prods. Co. v. Stone & Webster Eng’g Corp., 
51 F.3d 1229, 1236 (4th Cir. 1995). But if 
a court denies summary judgment based 
on its view of the law, the above reason-
ing does not apply. Moreover, the district 
court settles something about the merits 
of the claim; the denial decides more than 
that the case should go to trial. Indeed, it 
is making law of the case, which the par-
ties may be permitted to challenge in the 
district court only on limited grounds. 
There are good reasons to permit 
post-trial, post-judgment review of a de-
nial of summary judgment when the ques-
tion to be posed is a question of law and 
the issue presented on appeal has not been 
mooted. First, the task of determining 
the bases on which summary judgment 
was denied and whether those bases are 
“legal” or “factual” is no longer “dubious,” 
if it ever was. Since at least the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Johnson v. Jones, 515 
U.S. 304, 313 (1995), courts of appeals 
have had to decide whether a summary 
judgment denial was based on the court’s 
conclusion that genuine issues of material 
fact precluded summary judgment or on 
the court’s legal conclusions concerning 
whether the undisputed facts gave de-
fendant an immunity from suit. Johnson 
required this determination because the 
Supreme Court there held that only in 
the latter circumstance is an interlocutory 
appeal of the denial available under the 
collateral order doctrine. Johnson v. Jones 
explicitly rejected the argument that the 
line that the Court was requiring courts 
of appeals to draw would be “unworkable” 
and overly difficult. In addition, courts of 
appeals routinely categorize issues as ques-
tions of fact, questions of law, or mixed 
questions of fact and law, for purposes of 
determining the appropriate standard of 
review. Federal courts of appeals thus have 
had plenty of practice in making these 
“law” vs. “fact” distinctions.
Moreover, appellate courts’ greater 
Pre- and Post-Judgment Review of Summary Judgment Denials
expertise (than trial courts) in deciding 
questions of law joins with the policies 
that support the final judgment rule (post-
poning appeal until district court process-
ing of a case has been completed) to argue 
for post-judgment review of law-based 
summary judgment denials.
A number of circuits rationalized their 
refusal to entertain post-trial, post-judg-
ment appeals from denials of motions for 
summary judgment by asserting that the 
proper remedy for an erroneous denial 
of summary judgment was either inter-
locutory appeal or a Rule 50 motion for 
judgment as a matter of law. But interloc-
utory appeals often are not available and, 
in our federal system, are disfavored when 
an adequate remedy for an error can be 
provided after final judgment. Once a final 
judgment has been entered, the aggrieved 
party may draw into question on appeal all 
prior orders that led to the final judgment.
As for Rule 50 motions, if the question 
that would be posed after trial is no differ-
ent from the question that was posed by 
the motion for summary judgment, it is 
not self-evident why a redundant motion 
should be necessary. What good reason is 
there to impose the procedural burden of 
requiring a party to raise again the same 
legal points that it made in its summary 
judgment motion? The better rule is that a 
litigant should not need to preserve legal 
arguments that it made in its motion for 
summary judgment by filing Rule 50 mo-
tions reiterating the point. And it would 
seem to be inconsistent with law-of-the-
case doctrine to demand that litigants 
who lost on a legal point made in support 
of their motion for summary judgment 
raise that legal argument again in a Rule 
50 motion for judgment as a matter of law. 
While we may permit parties to seek re-
consideration of prior interlocutory orders 
including denials of summary judgment, 
that is not to say that we do or should re-
quire parties to do so.
Even more importantly perhaps, it 
turns out that Rule 50 motions are not an 
appropriate vehicle to raise the legal issues 
on which summary judgment motions 
may have foundered. A Rule 50(a) motion 
is made, in a jury trial, when the party 
against whom judgment is sought has rest-
ed its case; the motion is based on the trial 
record to that point. The movant argues 
that “a reasonable jury would not have a 
legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find 
for the [non-moving] party on [a par-
ticular] issue,” and that the court should 
resolve that issue against the non-moving 
party and grant judgment as a matter of 
law against the non-moving party because 
an identified claim or defense cannot be 
maintained without a finding on that issue 
favorable to the non-moving party. Rule 
50 thus focuses exclusively on the circum-
stances in which a reasonable jury would 
not have a legally sufficient evidentiary 
basis to find for the non-moving party on 
one or more issues, and explicitly ties the 
conclusion that one party is entitled to 
judgment to the absence of sufficient ev-
idence to allow victory for the other side. 
(It corresponds to that portion of Rule 56 
that focuses on whether genuine issues of 
material fact are posed.)
Rule 50(b) provides that when the 
jmol motion is not granted, the court sub-
mits the action to the jury “subject to a 
“When interlocutory appeals of 
denials of summary judgment 
are permitted, those appeals 
should be permissive, rather 
than mandatory, as the federal 
intermediate appellate courts 
nearly unanimously hold.”
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later determination of the legal questions 
raised by the motion.” But if the legal 
questions raised by the motion go only 
to whether the evidence was sufficient to 
go to the jury, then nothing in Rule 50(b) 
supports the proposition that a Rule 50 
motion properly may be the vehicle to 
seek and receive judgment as a matter of 
law based on purely legal issues.
Is there merit to insistence upon the aggrieved party doing something more 
than failing with its summary judgment 
motion, to preserve the issue for appeal? 
It is said that reviving the issue in some 
manner would help to avoid surprise to 
the appellee, and could give the trial court 
an opportunity to revisit its earlier ruling. 
However, I don’t know why raising on 
appeal the legal rulings made in support 
of the denial of a motion for summary 
judgment should come as a surprise to the 
prevailing party. The making of summa-
ry judgment motions and the writing of 
memoranda in support of and in opposi-
tion to such motions is a lengthy, onerous 
and expensive process. Given this reality, 
it is not as though the legal points made 
in connection with a summary judgment 
motion “fly under the radar,” and might 
bite an unsuspecting adversary after final 
judgment. Nor will the motion for sum-
mary judgment likely have been made and 
briefed so long before a case went to trial 
and judgment that opposing counsel will 
have forgotten about it.
Nor do I see any unfairness to the pre-
vailing party in having to defend its judg-
ment against contentions that a ruling on 
the law, on which the denial of summary 
judgment was predicated, was erroneous 
and harmed the losing party. Any preju-
dicial error in the proceedings below can 
nullify the judgment, whether that error 
was made in rulings on pleadings, rulings 
on discovery, or rulings at trial. To grant 
review to the summary judgment denial 
and to reverse the judgment would not 
be unjust to the party that was victorious 
after all the evidence was in, for the appel-
late court would be deciding that, under 
the law, the prevailing party below was not 
entitled to win; indeed, if the court were 
to reverse, it would be deciding that his 
adversary had been entitled to win, as a 
matter of law, on his motion for summary 
judgment.
In some circumstances, a consistent 
failure to object to the admission of evi-
dence that would be irrelevant on the ap-
pellant’s theory of the case, as marshaled 
in its summary judgment motion and 
memoranda in support, might support 
a holding that the appellant had waived 
or not “preserved” the error. A failure to 
offer evidence in support of the summary 
judgment movant’s theory of the case also 
could be damaging. Similarly, a failure to 
object to jury instructions that were in-
consistent with the theory of the summary 
judgment motion or a failure to propose 
jury instructions that would apply the 
theory of the summary judgment motion 
might warrant support for a holding that 
the appellant had waived or not “pre-
served” the error. Perhaps other acts or 
omissions might support the same result. 
But appellate courts should not bar ap-
peals from law-based summary judgment 
denials on these grounds until the appeals 
courts have given litigants advance warn-
ing of the acts and omissions that might 
constitute waiver or failure to preserve—
so that such appellants do not become 
the ones with just complaints of “unfair 
surprise.” As of now, there is little law that 
indicates what, if anything (other than mak-
ing a Rule 50 motion), a litigant must do to 
preserve for appeal the allegedly erroneous 
denial of a law-based summary judgment 
denial.  
Also favoring review is the fact that 
denial of post-judgment review to deni-
als of summary judgment would inhibit 
effective appellate court scrutiny of trial 
court compliance with Rule 56. Moreover, 
appeal from the denial of summary judg-
ment will be timely so long as the appeal 
from the final judgment was timely, so 
there will be no need for any tolling of 
the time to appeal, notwithstanding the 
Supreme Court’s indication in Ortiz that 
the time to appeal the summary judgment 
denial in that case had long since run. ■
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I Know Who You Are and I Saw What You Did: 
Social Networks and the Death of Privacy
(Free Press 2012, paperback 2013)
How many things did you reveal 
about yourself online today? As 
many individuals have already 
learned the hard way, the same 
power of information sharing that 
can topple governments can also 
topple a person’s career, marriage, 
finances, or even his or her future. 
Prof. Andrews explores how our 
digital identities on the Web—
email, personal websites, and social 
media pages—are starting to overshadow our physical 
identities. How can you protect the privacy of your digital 
self? This book shows how people can fight back when 
what they post on social networks is used against them.  
Andrews also ignites a battle for further protections, from 
a right to connect to a right to privacy, and proposes a 
Social Network Constitution to protect us all.
BOOKSHELF      New books by faculty
Edward Lee
Professor of Law
The Fight for the Future: How People Defeated 
Hollywood and Saved the Internet—For Now
(Self-published, print and ebook, fall 2013)
Wikipedia went dark on January 
18, 2012. So did thousands of other 
websites, including search giant 
Google, all to protest a controversial 
copyright bill called the Stop Online 
Piracy Act (SOPA). The protest even 
helped to ignite mass demonstra-
tions on the streets of over 250 cities 
in all 27 countries of the European 
Union to stop a similar attempt 
to regulate the Internet under the 
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA). Prof. Lee’s 
new book provides a gripping look at how people orga-
nized the largest Internet protest in history, plus the largest 
single-day demonstration on the streets of 27 countries of 
the European Union. In the end, this grassroots movement 
won an unexpected, but historic first victory in the fight 
for a “free and open Internet.”
Richard Warner
Professor of Law
Unauthorized Access: The Crisis in Online 
Privacy and Security (with Robert H. Sloan)
(CRC Press, summer 2013)
Profs. Warner and Sloan—two 
renowned experts on computer 
security and law—explore the 
well-established connection be-
tween social norms, privacy, secu-
rity, and technological structure. 
This approach is the key to under-
standing information security and 
informational privacy, providing 
a practical framework to address 
ethical and legal issues. Bridging 
the gap among computer scientists, economists, lawyers, 
and public policy makers, this book provides technically 
and legally sound public policy guidance about online 
privacy and security. It emphasizes the need to make 
trade-offs among the complex concerns that arise in the 
context of online privacy and security.
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